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Where in the world are you? 
Assessing the importance of circumstance and effort in a world of 
different mean country incomes and (almost) no migration 
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Suppose that all people in the world are allocated only two 
characteristics: country where they live and social class within that 
country. Assume further that there is no migration. We show that 90 
percent of variability in people’s global income position (percentile in 
world income distribution) is explained by only these two pieces of 
information. Mean country income (circumstance) explains 60 percent, 
and social class (both circumstance and effort) 30 percent of global 
income position. But as at least 1/3 of the latter number is due to 
circumstance as well, the overall part of circumstance is unlikely to be 
under 70 percent. On average,  “drawing” one-notch higher social class 
(on a twenty-class scale) is equivalent to living in a  twelve-percent 
richer country. Once people are allocated their social class, it becomes 
important, not only whether the country they are allocated to is rich or 
poor, but whether it is egalitarian or not. This is particularly important 
for the people who “draw” low or high social classes; for the middle 
classes, income distribution is much less important than mean country 
income. 
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1. Setting the stage 
  
 In Rawls’s Law of Peoples individuals from various countries meet to organize a 
contractual arrangement regulating their relations in a metaphor similar to the justly 
celebrated one for the citizens of the same nation from his Theory of Justice. There are 
differences though in the global gathering since the meeting is between representatives of 
each nation (people) rather than between all world individuals. And the outcome is 
different too, in two important respects:  Rawls rejects the application of the global 
difference principle in favor of fairly limited aid to the “burdened peoples” that are 
hampered by poverty from achieving a “decent” society, and assumes that migration 
takes place only in response to egregious violation of human rights, famines,  and 
political and religious oppression. In other words, regarding the two aspects which 
concern us here, global redistribution is minimal and with a clear cut-off point,2 and 
economically-driven migration is not approved.3 Thus, peoples are basically separated 
entities.  
 
 We shall take Rawls’s assumptions as a fair representation of the existing world 
situation. Indeed, they are. In 2004, aid from rich to poor nations amounted to one-quarter 
of one percent of rich nation’s Gross Domestic Income.4 At the same time, these nations 
were spending, on average, more than 30 percent of GDI for domestic social transfers. 
Obviously, domestic and foreign poor are not treated equally: one “domestic poor” is 
worth, on  average, about  100,000 “foreign poor (Milanovic, 2006). Similarly, using an 
optimal taxation framework, Kopczuk, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2005), calculate that the 
implicit weight US policy places on a poor non-citizen is 1/2000 of the implicit weight it 
assigns to an American poor. Second, in 2002, total migration from poor to rich countries 
was 2.6 million of people which represented a tiny percentage (less than 1/20 of one 
                                                 
2
 Not having open-ended international transfers was one of key points explicitly stressed by Rawls (1999, 
p. 106 and p. 118). 
 
3
 See Rawls (1999, p. 39 and p. 74). 
 
4
  See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/39/23664717.gif, accessed February 9, 2007. This includes only 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members (basically, the “old OECD” countries). 
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percent) of  more than 5 billion people living in  poor countries.5 So, both of Rawls’ 
assumptions (or desiderata) seem to hold.  
 
But we shall, for the sake of exposition,  modify the Rawlsian metaphor in so 
much as we shall let the global  assembly (i) be the one of all individuals in the world, 
and not of peoples’ representatives, and (ii) not be designed for the individuals to reach a 
contractarian arrangement. As is customary (from Theory of Justice), individuals meet 
behind the veil of ignorance. At our original position, each of them is allocated two  
characteristics that will determine his fate: county and social class within that country. 6  
As we have just seen, assignment to a country is “fate” since there is no inter-country 
movement of people. Assignment to social class can also be seen as “fate” if there is no 
social mobility within countries. At the other extreme, with perfect social mobility, 
assignment to social class would not matter as each individual would find, through his 
own exertion and luck, his merited position in society.  
 
 We know that differences between mean country incomes, and differences in 
income between social classes within countries are large. From the work on global 
inequality (Milanovic 2002, 2005), we also know that about three-quarters of global 
inequality is due to between-national income differences. Consequently, to what nation 
one gets allocated is indeed of  significant import for own’s life chances. By being 
allocated to a country, the individual receives two “public” goods that are unalterable by 
his own effort and that are basically fixed during the largest part of his/her life:  mean 
income of the country (relative to the rest of the world) and national level of inequality. 
This represents, of course, a somewhat strong assumption. While these parameters are 
unalterable by any one’s individual effort,  there are indeed many examples that within 
one’s  lifetime the relative position of  a country has been transformed, whether by being 
                                                 
5
  See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/37/34607274.pdf, accessed February 9, 2007. The poor and rich 
countries are defined here conventionally: the rich as OECD members, the poor as everybody else.   
 
6
 If there are N countries, the probability of being assigned a given country is 1/N. In other words, the 
probability does not depend on country’s population. We work here with countries alone, or with Concept 1 
(Milanovic 2005).  One could of course envisage a different “lottery” where the probability of being  
assigned a country would be proportional to its population size, or even to its share of the people born in a 
given year.  
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improved, as in the case of China over the last quarter century, or worsened as in the 
example of Argentina after World War II,  or  many African and transition countries 
more recently. Even national inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, which, as Li, 
Squire and Zou (1998) show, tends to be fairly sluggish, can experience, at times, violent 
swings. The increases in inequality during the first stage of transition from planned to 
market economy (including in China), or under the Thatcher-Reagan rule in the UK and 
the United States, are such examples. For simplicity, however, we shall assume that, for 
an individual, both mean country income and inequality in his country of assignment are 
given and unrelated to any effort or desert from his part. They are thus two “morally 
arbitrary” features allocated to him (see Pogge 1994. p. 197;  Nagel 2005, p. 119). They 
will be referred to as “circumstances” (Roemer 1998).  
 
Assignment to social  class is more ambiguous in its effects than the assignment 
to a country: on the one hand, assignment to low (or high) social class will determine to a 
large extent individual’s life-time prospects and hence his life-time income. One may 
(almost) argue that there are no reasons for thinking that being assigned to a top or 
bottom social class may not be as much a position unalterable in one’s life as being 
assigned to a country. Yet, there is some inter-class social mobility in practically every 
society with some countries closer to one theoretical end of the spectrum (no social 
mobility at all) than to the other (full social mobility, viz. irrelevance of  social class 
“assigned” at birth).7 In that sense, assignment to social class cannot be regarded as much 
part of “fate” as country assignment in a world with no migration. However, because of 
existing various levels of social mobility within the countries, country assignment will 
also determine what extent of social mobility one may hope to achieve. In the rest of the 
analysis, we shall (at first) assume,  rather generously, that most of social movement 
within country is the result of personal effort and luck.8  In other words, if we find people 
                                                 
7
 But surely, we cannot think of any country where assignment to social class (at birth) is irrelevant for 
one’s future prospects. 
 
8
  Assignment to a social class differs from the “assignment” of an unalterable Gini coefficient. Since 
individuals are allowed to move up and down along the social scale of their country, the first assignment 
has to do with mobility. The second (the Gini coefficient) has to do with inequality of distribution, or more 
exactly with a share of each social class in  total income. Thus, a society can be very unequal—in the sense 
that the relative income of the poor is low—while at the same time it allows for high mobility (in the sense, 
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in a given social class  within their nation, we shall assume that being there (largely) 
reflects their work effort and luck. It is the second part of Roemer’s dichotomy: the 
“effort.” 
 
This issue can be set into more explicitly Roemerian (1998) terms. Suppose that 
we observe two distributions of outcome (income) that correspond to two unknown 
distributions of effort (Figure 1, panel a). If we believe that the oucomes are strongly 
influenced by unequal circumstances such as different mean incomes of the two 
countries, Roemer’s definition of equality of opportunity  requires that people whose 
effort, conditional on circumstances, is the same be rewarded equally.9 Suppose that the 
two individuals whose effort thus defined is the same (that is, they are at the same 
percentile, 1-p,  of their countries’ effort distributions) are A and B. If we adjust for the 
advantage conferred by higher mean income to A, and still obtain a distribution of 
income such as shown in panel b, we may conclude that there are other  circumstances 
for which we have failed to adjust. They could be country-specific institutions, policies 
and norms that limit social mobility or more generally that drive the wedge between the 
outcomes and individual effort expended,. These additional factors also confer  
“advantages” to individuals and have to be included under the rubric of  “circumstance”.  
Panel c shows the situation when we have adjusted for all (reasonable) circumstances that 
may give advantage to one or the other individual (some circumstances may work in 
favor of one, and others in favor of  the other person).  To put it more succinctly, 
circumstance for each type of individual j (where type here is defined by citizenship) 
                                                                                                                                                 
that being born poor does not “condemn” one to remain in that class). It is often thought that  the US, 
compared to Europe, exemplifies precisely such a society, even if recent studies (Blanden, Gregg and 
Machin, 2005) have cast doubt on the superior social mobility in the United States. See also the discussion 
in Jackson and Segal (2004, p.p. 29-30).   
 
9
 In other words, conditional on circumstance, people at the same percentile of effort should be rewarded  
the same (or treated equally). Roemer (1998, Chapter 3) distinguishes between relative effort (“degree of 
effort”) and absolute effort (“level of effort”). Relative effort is effort expended compared to what is 
expected with a given set of circumstances.  Equality of opportunity requires that the outcomes be the same 
for each percentile of the distribution of effort (that is, for each relative effort) allowing thus the same 
absolute effort to be be rewarded differently.   
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consists of two parts: µj and sj where µj = mean income of country j,  and sj = country-
specific part of circumstance in addition to mean income. 10 
 
 Having thus set the stage, the questions we want to ask are the follows. How 
much of one’s life chances will be determined by his assignment to a given country vs. 
given social class? Does this systematically vary with social class? How much can one 
improve one’s position in world income distribution through his own effort (that is, by 
climbing social ladders in his country)? What does this tell us about equality of 
opportunity across all individuals in the world? Or, what does it tell us about morally 
arbitrary inequality at the global level, inequality which,  according to Rawls (1971, 
Chapter II), ought to be, within each nation-state, reduced or eliminated? 11 
 
We shall first (section 2) describe the source of global income distribution data 
that help us address these questions empirically and review our definitions of country and 
class. In Section 3, we present some broad regularities regarding the way global income 
is distributed between countries and social classes. Sections 4 and 5 are the core parts of 
the paper: they present the analysis that attempts the answers the questions  posed above.  
The last part gives the conclusions.  
                                                 
10
 Note that the income distributions, thus fully “cleared” of all circumstances, may still be of different 
shapes: the distributions of effort may be different.   
 
11
 “..the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be 
improperly influenced by these factors [initial distribution of wealth; one’s birth] so arbitrary from a moral 
point of view. The liberal interpretation…tries to correct for this by adding to the requirement of careers 
open to talent the further condition of the fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, p. 63).  
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Figure 1. Equality of opportunity for two different types of individuals 
Panel a:  A and B are at the same percentile (1-p) of distribution of effort for two 
different types (rich and poor country) 
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel b. A and B after contolling for the income difference between the countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) A and B after controlling for differences in income and social mobility  
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2. Data and definitions 
 
 The data used in the paper come from the World Income Distribution (WYD)   
database constructed to study the evolution of global inequality. The database is 
comprised almost entirely of micro data from representative household surveys from 
most of  the countries in the world. For the benchmark year 2002, which is used here, the 
data come from 123 household surveys representing 120 countries12 and accounting for 
94 percent of world population and 98 percent of world dollar income.13 The 
geographical coverage is almost complete for all parts of the world except Africa (see 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Population and income coverage of the surveys (in %) 
 Africa Asia Latin 
America 
E.Europe 
and CIS  
WENAO World 
Population  77 96 96 97 99 94 
Income 71 95 95 99 100 98 
Number of 
surveys 
(countries)1/ 
 
 
29 
 
 
26 
 
 
21 
 
 
26 
 
 
21 
 
 
123 
Source: World Income Distribution database.  
Note: WENAO is Western Europe, North America and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). CIS = 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Eastern Europe included all formerly Communist countries (including CIS countries).  
1/
 For China, India and Indonesia both rural and urban surveys are included.  
 
 For the vast majority of surveys (117 out of 123) we had access to micro data 
which means that any type of distribution (by decile, ventile, percentile; by  households 
or individuals) could have been created. In order to limit the number of data points and 
make the analysis manageable and intelligible we have limited the number of data points 
per country to 20 ventiles (each ventile contains 5 percent of country’s  population). All 
individuals in a survey are ranked from the poorest to the richest according to their 
household per capita income (or expenditures, depending on  what welfare aggregate is 
used in the survey). Since not all countries produce annual surveys, we had to use a 
                                                 
12
 For China, India and Indonesia we have both rural and urban surveys. 
 
13
 We cannot express the share of the included countries in terms of $PPP income because for most of the 
countries for which we lack surveys, we also lack PPP data (e.g.  Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan etc.) The dollar 
incomes however are typically available.  
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“benchmark” year (2002 in this case), that is, try to get the 2002 household surveys for as 
many countries as possible, but where there were no surveys conducted in 2002, to use a 
year as close to it as possible. In the event, 81 surveys were conducted in the benchmark 
year or one year before or after it,  and 115 surveys within two years of the benchmark.   
These 115 surveys cover 5,733 million people, viz.,  practically all people (98.8 percent) 
who are included in the analysis here.  For the surveys conducted in non-benchmark 
years, we adjust reported incomes by the Consumer Price Index of the country so that all 
amounts are expressed in 2002 local currency units. These amounts are then converted 
into international (PPP) dollars using the 2002 estimates of  $PPP exchange rates 
provided by the World Bank. Thus, for each income group (ventile) for each country we 
calculate the average per capita amount of PPP dollars received as income (or spent in the 
form expenditures). 14 
 
 The fact that each country is divided into 20 groups of equal size (ventiles) is 
extremely helpful.  15This allows us to compare the positions of say, the third ventile of 
people in China with the seventh ventile of people in Nigeria etc. It also allows us to 
define social classes the same way across all countries. To fix the terminology, we shall 
call each ventile a “social class”. The terms will be used interchangeably although of 
course I am aware that, from sociological point of view, social class is a much richer and 
complex phenomenon than conveyed by a mere position in a distribution of  income. 
Social classes thus run from 1 to 20 with 20 being the highest. Social class determines a 
person’s position in national income distribution.16 
 
                                                 
14
 Obviously, each ventile is of equal size for any given country. Between countries, ventile sizes are quite 
different: one ventile in China consists of 64.7 million people while, at the other extreme, Luxembourg’s 
ventile, has only 200,000 people. China, India and Indonesia (“whole” countries) are used in  the rest of the 
analysis rather than their separate urban and rural surveys.  
 
15
  We have a total of 115 countries; five countries have fewer fractiles than twenty and  they are omitted 
from the analysis. 
 
16
 “Income class” might have been a more accurate appellation but in order to  emphasize social (and 
income) position within a nation, I prefer “social class.”  
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 Social class and country of residence  pin down a person’s  position in global 
income distribution.17 That position is expressed by his percentile rank in the overall 
world income distribution (given  by his household per capita income or expenditures 
expressed in dollars of equal purchasing power). A person can be, say at the 72nd 
percentile in the world—implying that his income is higher than incomes of 72 out of 
each 100 people in the world. This will be referred for simplicity simply as “position” or 
“position in the world.” Since we divided the world into one hundred percentiles 
according to per capita income, the position runs from 1 (lowest) to 100 (highest). Each 
percentile contains, of course, 1/100th of world population included in the analysis here, 
i.e.,  approximately 57 million people.  
 
 We now move to some empirical issues showing how the world thus “partitioned” 
onto countries and social classes really looks.  
 
3. Diversity of the world 
  
 Figure 2 combines the two aspects, of social (within-national) and international 
(differences in mean countries’ incomes) distributions. Income of each ventile is shown 
in the global distribution. Consider Germany. Since Germany is a rich country, and its 
income inequality  is moderate, most of its population will be highly placed in world 
income distribution. The poorest German ventile is at the 73rd percentile of world income 
distribution. All other ventiles are obviously higher, and the richest ventile belongs to the 
top world percentile. The same interpretation is for all other countries.  We call such 
curves “the position curves”. Unlike Germany, where the  span between the richest and 
the poorest ventile is 27 percentiles,  in China, the distribution covers a much wider range 
from the third to  the 85th  percentile. Brazil, with its unequal income distribution, covers 
practically the entire global spectrum, from the lowest percentiles to the richest.  India, in 
contrast,  is shown to be fairly poor with the poorest ventile belonging to the 4th  poorest 
percentile of the world and the richest ventile to the 70th.  This last position shows that 
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 As mentioned, the household surveys we use are both income- and expenditure (consumption)-based. For 
simplicity of presentation we speak throughout of “income” distribution and “income position in the 
world.”  
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the richest people in India (as a group—admittedly a large one since it contains more than 
50 million people) have lower per capita income than the poorest people (as a group) in 
Germany. In other words, there is no overlap between the two distributions: if we picture 
the two distributions, with income on the horizontal axis, the Indian income distribution 
will end before the German distribution starts. This “no overlap” condition is not satisfied 
for any other two distributions shown here.  
 
 The graph can also be read as a type of the generalized Lorenz curve where 
instead of the income level on the vertical axis, we have income position in the world. 
The advantage of this “positional” approach is that it reduces the measurement error, 18 
but since position is bounded from above these specific generalized Lorenz curves will in 
many cases be concave rather than (as we are used to) convex. The interpretation 
however is the same as with generalized Lorenz curves.19 From  Figure 2 we can easily 
conclude that Sri Lanka’s distribution is first-order  dominant with respect  to India, and 
that Germany’s distribution is first-order dominant compared to any other country 
(although barely so to Brazil at the very top of income distribution). 20 No first-order 
dominance can be established between Brazil, China and India because of the situation at 
the bottom  where the poorest Brazilians are shown to be poorer than the poorest people 
in  India and China. Of course, the middle class Brazilians (approximately people in the 
ventiles 7 through 15) are better off than the middle classes in China, Sri Lanka and 
India. One may also note that the biggest difference in the position holds for the poorest 
ventiles: while in Germany, the poorest ventile is at the 73rd  world percentile, in the other 
four countries, the poorest ventiles are at the very bottom of the global income 
distribution.  
                                                 
18
 Household surveys do not measure income or expenditures perfectly. They are less likely however to 
make such large mistakes that  may result in misplacing of individuals into “wrong” world percentiles. 
 
19
  First-order positional dominance must imply first order income dominance. The reverse may not hold 
because the distribution may be income dominant but the difference in income may be so small as to place 
a social class from both countries into the same global percentile.  
 
20
 Notice that the first-order dominance is a less demanding requirement than the “no overlap” requirement. 
The latter implies the former.  
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Figure 2. The position curves: inequality in the world—by countries and by social class 
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Source: World Income Distribution (WYD); benchmark year 2002. 
 
 
 World income distribution can be conventionally broken down into that part of 
inequality which is due to the differences between mean country incomes, and that part of 
inequality due to inequality within countries. All studies show that the between 
inequalities are much more important. 21 Using 2002 data,  Table 2 shows the actual 
global inequality between individuals, and inequality that would have existed if all people 
in  each country had the mean income of their country. As can be observed, depending on 
the inequality measure, between 66 and 87 percent of global inequality is due to 
differences in mean incomes. Taking the Gini coefficient, which  is the most frequently 
used measure in global inequality studies, income differences between world citizens 
                                                 
21
 See, for example, Milanovic (2002, p.78 and 2005, p. 112), Sutcliffe (2004), Bourguignon and Morrisson 
(2002, p. 734), Berry and Serieux (2007, p. 84).  
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amount to 65.5 Gini points out of which 55.7 points are due to the between-country 
component.22  
 
Table 2. Global income inequality and the between-country component of it 
(benchmark year 2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Global inequality 
between individuals 
The between-
country 
component of 
global inequality 
Share of (2) in (1)  
(in percent) 
Relative mean deviation 0.517 0.450 87 
Coefficient of variation 1.751 1.278 73 
Standard deviation of log of 
incomes 1.234 0.982 80 
Gini coefficient 0.655 0.557 85 
Mehran measure 0.783 0.683 87 
Piesch measure 0.591 0.494 84 
Kakwani measure 0.357 0.274 77 
Theil entropy measure 0.835 0.579 69 
Theil mean log deviation 0.846 0.562 66 
Source: World income distribution (WYD) database. All income expressed in 2002 international 
dollars. 
 
                                                 
22
 The between component of global inequality is the same thing as Concept 2 inequality (Milanovic, 
2005).  Global inequality between individuals is also called Concept 3 inequality.  
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4. The relative importance of country vs. social class (or effort vs. circumstance) 
 
Predicting global income position based on knowledge of country and class (in the 
aggregate) 
 
As we have seen, one’s position depends on two factors: allocation to a country  
and allocation to a social class. We can write for i-th individual living in j-th country: 
 
ijijjjij CbGbmbbP ε++++= 3210     (1) 
where Pij = income position (percentile) in world distribution, mj = mean country income, 
Gj = national inequality (say, Gini coefficient), and Cij = person’s social class in country j 
and εij = the error term..  
 
The results of estimation of  (1)  are shown in Table 3.23 We begin by asking how 
much of one’s global income position is explained by country’s mean income alone 
(regression 1). The answer is 60 percent. Note that each increase of 10 percent in mean 
country income raises person’s position in the world by about 2.3 percentiles. But when 
individuals are allocated a country, they are not only allocated its mean income but also 
its inequality level. Including both of them in the regression however does not make 
much of a difference (regression 2). 24 
 
By putting together country and social class (regression 3),  we are able to explain 
more than 90 percent of the variation in people’s positions in the global income 
distribution.  As before, each 10 percent increase in mean country income lifts a person, 
on average, by 2.2 percentage points in the world distribution. Being placed in a higher 
                                                 
23
 The regressions are run unweighted implying that each country (regardless of  its population) matters  
equally. This makes sense from the point of view of  the original position where, for an individual,  the  
probability of being assigned to any given country is the same. The Rawlsian lottery would be different if 
probabilities of country assignment were proportional  to the population sizes of the countries. It is not an 
unreasonable assumption but it departs considerably from the Rawlsian metaphor.  
 
24
 Each Gini point increase will, on average,  lower person’s position by about 0.33 percentage points. This, 
of course, holds only in the aggregate. If we break individuals by social class, then living in a more unequal 
country (and controlling for mean income) would be advantageous for higher-class individuals. And  the 
reverse for people allocated to low social classes. This point is pursued below.  
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social class increases one’s position by 2.8 percentiles on average. Thus, in the aggregate, 
belonging to one-notch higher social class is equivalent to residing in a country  whose 
mean income is 12 percent higher. The trade-off between social class, or what we may 
consider to be a partial reflection of one’s effort, and the morally arbitrary placement in a 
rich county is now clear. If one were, through his effort and luck, to climb eight social 
classes, he would have “traversed” the road equivalent to being born in  a country about 
twice as rich.  
 
When we break the importance of “circumstance” (country) and “effort” (social 
class) in explaining one’s position in global income distribution, we find that 63 percent  
is due to the country of residence, and 31 percent to social class.25 However, social class 
can be fully treated as “effort” only if we are willing to argue that (1) social class a 
person is assigned at birth and social class he is in now are totally orthogonal, and that (2) 
the latter is dependent on his effort (and luck) alone. More formally, we can express that 
situation as the one where the correlation (ρ) between one’s current income and his 
parents’ income is zero. At the other extreme, with no social mobility at all, one’s social 
class at birth determines his current social class (observed in the surveys). In that case, 
the entire social class variable must be “ascribed” to circumstance. 26  
 
The situation in the real world will, of course, differ between the countries and 
will lie somewhere between the two extremes. Ideally, if we had the data for the 
correlation of children’s and parental income, we could use these country-specific 
coefficients to model the actual role of social class. Unfortunately, we have such data for 
only half a dozen, mostly rich, countries. They show that social  mobility is relatively 
high in Nordic European countries and Canada, that it is less in the United States and the 
UK, and (arguably) even less in the continental Europe (see Solon, 1999,  pp. 1784-89; 
Checci et al. 1999; Bjorklund and Jantti 1997). The value of  ρ ranges from 0.2 in Nordic 
countries (and in some studies only) to 0.6 There are also some presumptions that in the 
                                                 
25
 This is obtained by the analysis of  the variance and is hence independent of the order the regressors are 
introduced (mean country income before social class or the reverse).  
 
26
 Social mobility is the complement to ρ: m(t) = 1 – ρ(Yo,Yt) where m(t) = mobility over the period t, and 
Yo and Yt incomes at respectively times 0 and t.    
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Third World countries social mobility is less than in the rich world and  that it is the least 
in Africa and Latin America (Lam and Schoeni, 1993). Based on our survey of the 
literature, we have incorporated these very tentative results into our “base case” scenario 
on mobility shown in Table 3. To see how the results may be sensitive to different 
mobility assumptions, we introduce also two different cases: optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios, where social mobility is respectively greater or less than in the base case 
scenario. 27 Notice that the regional ranking by social mobility broadly coincides with the 
rankings according to inequality. Although, of course, the two concepts are different and 
can move in the opposite directions, it has been suggested that they are unlikely to do so 
(Davies et al. 2005).  
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between parental and children’s income 
used in the simulations 
 Base case Optimistic (high 
mobility) 
Pessimistic 
(low mobility) 
Gini  
Nordic countries 0.2 0.15 0.3 27.5 
Rest of WENAO 0.4 0.3 0.5 33.7 
Eastern Europe/CIS 0.4 0.3 0.5 30.6 
Asia 0.5 0.4 0.6 37.6 
Latin America 0.66 0.5 0.9 53.8 
Africa 0.66 0.5 0.9 42.6 
Source: Gini data from World Income Distribution database (benchmark year 2002). 
 
Once we have assumed correlations for all the countries in the sample, we 
proceed to the following simulation exercise. Take a country j with its correlation 
coefficient ρj. We of course do not know in what ventile of income distributions have 
been parents of people whom we observe in (say) the bottom ventile. To estimate this, we 
run a random data generation process 
 
jijjij eyy += ρ*          (2) 
 
where yij =  income (in logs) of i-th individual drawn from a normal distribution,  
yij*= income (in logs) of i-th individual’s parents (the asterisk denotes parents) and ej = 
                                                 
27
 A caveat ought to be made. The correlation numbers we use here to motivate the simulations are mostly 
derived from correlations of children’s and parental earnings (not income as we would ideally like).  
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the error term drawn from a normal distribution N(0,1). After generating incomes of 
parents and children, we partition both parents’ and children’s incomes into twenty 
ventiles, and for each  children’s ventile calculate the conditional distribution of “past” 
(parents’) ventiles. Figure 3 shows such cumulative conditional distributions for the 
bottom and top ventile when ρ’s take values of 0.5 and 0.9. As can be easily seen, with a 
high ρ, people whom we currently observe in the bottom (top) deciles are very likely to 
have come from parents who were also in the bottom (top) deciles. But as ρ decreases, 
that probability lessens. For example, with ρ=0.9, people who are currently in the bottom 
ventile come with an almost 80 percent probability from the parents who have been 
located in the bottom five deciles (right panel in Figure 3). But with greater social 
mobility (and a lower ρ=0.5), such probability is just over 60 percent. If eventually ρ 
were to be 0, the distribution of parents’ income (or more accurately, the distribution of 
parents’ ventiles) will be the same for each ventile of children.  
 18 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative distribution functions of parents’ ventile position for the 
children in bottom and top ventile 
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Note: simulations based on equation (2). Children’s ventiles are labeled “current”. 
 
 
Using thus generated parental ventile positions, we run regressions  
 
ijijjjij uCGmP ++++= )(*4210 ρββββ     (3) 
 
where Cij* =  expected social class of i-th individual’s parents. This is  calculated 
as the mean of the conditional distribution of parents’ ventile positions.28  Cij* is the same 
for all individuals (children) belonging to a given ventile (and the same country), i.e., the 
expected position of their parents is the same.  This brings us a bit closer to isolating the 
effect of circumstance (since it introduces inter-ventile variability of  parents’ position) 
but still misses a part due to individual effort because all individuals in a given social 
class who might have had, and are likely to have had, parents from different  social 
classes (see Figure 3) are assigned the same expected parents’ social class. The averaging 
accordingly compresses the variability of outcome that is due to individual effort. In 
columns (4)-(6) of Table 4, we show the results for the three scenarios delineated above, 
the base case, optimistic and pessimistic.  
                                                 
28
 That is, the means of the distributions such as  shown in Figure 2.    
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Comparing regressions (3) and (4), we note that the substitution of own ventile 
position by parents’ ventile position leaves broadly unchanged the total “explained” 
variability of  income position in the world. Parents’ social class is not only statistically 
significant but in the absolute value greater than own social class: on average, having 
parents’ ventile position go up by one notch increases one’s position in the world by 6.3 
percentage points. The reason why the coefficient on parents’ social position is larger 
than on own position is easily explained if we consider that the effect of a positive ρ is 
that it “shrinks” the distribution of parents’ ventiles compared to the current (observed) 
distribution.29  In conditions of social mobility, however slight, people currently in the 
bottom social class have parents whose estimated social class is higher than the bottom 
(for otherwise there would be no mobility); people in the top social class, would likewise 
have parents whose expected social position is closer to the middle etc. This is illustrated 
in Figure 4 on the example of Germany.  The “shrinkage” of parents’ expected social 
class compared to the children’s’ produces a steeper line, as shown by the broken line in 
Figure 4, and thus each one-point increase in parents’ social class will have a greater 
absolute effect on one’s position in the world than one own similar one-step increase. 
Notice that in the extreme example of almost full mobility (with ρ→0), the broken line in  
Figure 4 would tend to become a straight vertical line starting at x=10, and then even the 
slightest increase in parents’ social class would have dramatic (positive) impact on one’s 
own position in world income distribution.  
                                                 
29
 Only if ρ were negative, would it lead to the “widening” of the spread of parents’ (compared to 
children’s) social class. On the contrary, every ρ>0 shrinks the distribution. 
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Figure 4. One’s position in the world, own social class, and parents’ social class 
(Germany 2002) 
 
 
 
 
The importance of circumstance decreases noticeably however in the optimistic 
scenario (see regression 5 in Table 4) when we assume relatively high (although uneven) 
social mobility in all parts of the world. Circumstances (country of citizenship and 
parents’ social class) explain now 72 percent of total variability in income position. With 
a pessimistic scenario of very low social mobility, the role of circumstances increases to 
94 percent again (regression 6 in Table 4).   
 
In conclusion, between 60 and more than 90 percent of variability in global 
income position can be explained by circumstances beyond individual control. Sixty 
percent represents the lower bound where only mean income of the country of citizenship 
and country’s inequality are allowed to play a role. Ninety percent or more is obtained 
when we include person’s parental income as part of circumstance, and use different 
assumptions regarding social mobility in various parts of the world. However, for the 
reasons explained above (assignment of the same parental ventile to all people within the 
current social class), ninety percent represents an overestimate of  the role of 
circumstance. A value of around 70 percent which we get using the optimistic  
70
80
90
10
0
pe
rc
en
tile
 in
 
w
or
ld
 in
co
m
e 
di
st
rib
u
tio
n
0 5 10 15 20
ventile of national income distribution
own parents
 21 
assumptions regarding social mobility seems a reasonable median estimate. In any case, 
the part which remains for effort and “episodic luck” (to use John Roemer’s felicitous 
phrase) must be quite small. The results illustrate the limitations of one’s own effort in 
effecting an improvement in one’s position in world income distribution.  
 
Table 4. Explaining one’s position in the world income distribution 
(dependent variable: percentile in world income distribution) 
 
Including parent’s social class 
 
Country only Country 
and 
social 
class 
Base Optimistic Pessimistic 
Hypothe-
tical 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mean per capita 
income (in ln) 
 
22.92 
 (0) 
22.32 
 (0) 
22.32 
(0) 
22.01 
(0) 
22.32 
(0) 
22.32 (0) --- 
Gini index (in %) 
 
 -0.33 
(0) 
-0.33 
(0) 
 
-0.33 
(0) 
-0.33 
(0) 
-0.33 
 (0) 
-0.14 
(0) 
Social class 
(ventile) 
  2.80 
(0) 
 
   4.77 
(0) 
Parents’ social 
class (ventile) 
 
   6.30 
 (0) 
17.47 (0) 5.40 
 (0) 
 
Constant term 
 
-126.2 
(0) 
 
-108.2 
(0) 
-137.6 
(0) 
-171.9 
(0) 
-291.7 
(0) 
-164.9 
(0) 
23.08 
(0) 
Number of 
observations 
2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 2300 
R2 adjusted 0.60 0.61 0.91 0.93 0.72 0.94 0.96 
F value 4254 
(0) 
1799 
(0) 
1202 
(0) 
1231 
(0) 
1199  
(0) 
1509 
 (0) 
3353 
(0) 
Note: The regressions are run with the cluster option to adjust for correlation of within-country 
observations. Regressions are unweighted. There are 115 countries times 20 ventiles = 2300 observations. p 
values between brackets. Social class ranges from 1 (lowest) to 20 (highest).  
 
Let us now compare this actual role of location to a hypothetical situation where 
all countries’ mean incomes are equal.30 We still “allocate” people to different countries 
and social classes in our Rawlsian lottery, but now location implies only a difference in 
income distributions between the countries (different Ginis), not the difference in average 
                                                 
30
 This is  the situation referred by Roemer (2007) as Equality of opportunity of degree  1. Incidentally, if 
all mean incomes were equalized the global Gini would be only 37.4 vs. the actual Gini of 64.2 (based on 
World Income Distribution 2002 dataset).  
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wealth. The results  are shown in column (7). The coefficient on social class more than 
doubles compared to regression (3), and when we decompose the two effects, social class  
is found to explain more than 90 percent of variability in global income position, while 
location (through its specific inequality) accounts for less than 5 percent. 31 The 
counterfactual allows us to conclude that location really matters through its mean income 
effect, not through its specific (national) inequality.  
                                                 
31
 Historically, something similar might have obtained in the early 19th century when, according to the 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) study of long-run global inequality,  class (within-national inequality) 
explained about 90 percent of overall world inequality. 
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Median global position and its variability when social class is given 
 After  this flight of fancy, let us return to the world as it is. A different way to 
look at effort is to consider by how much one’s position in the world improves if he or 
she is able to move up the ladder within his/her  country. For example, for a person in the 
bottom social class, the median position in the world is the 7th percentile. Suppose now 
that he manages to climb up to the 5th social class. His median position will have 
improved to the 39th percentile.  Another equivalent climb of five social classes up the 
ladder will place him in the 56th percentile. Figure 5 shows the results  for each of the 
twenty social classes. The marginal gains are very significant at the bottom (e.g., the 
move from the lowest the second social class improves one’s median position by 14 
percentiles), then taper off in the middle, and increase again at the very top: going from 
the 19th to the highest social class improves one’s median position by ten  percentiles 
(from 82 to 92).  
 
Figure 5. Median position in the world as function of social class 
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Note:  unweighted data, each country’s ventile represents one observation. 
 
 24 
 So far we have considered only the median position of a person if his national 
social class is given. What is important to take into account also is that the variability of 
one’s position in world income distribution is not the same regardless of social class. In 
other words, the distribution of positions for various social classes is different. Figure 6 
illustrates this for  the two extremes, the top and bottom social classes. The distributions 
are  of different shapes, in addition to covering obviously different parts of the global 
income distribution. The overlap between the two distributions is small but the very fact 
that it exists illustrates how unequal national mean incomes must be because in some 
cases people belonging to the top national social class are worse off than people who are 
in the bottom social class of another country. If one belongs to the lowest social class, he 
is very likely (probability of more than 60 percent)  to be placed in the bottom quintile of 
world income distribution. But he can, at the extreme, if he lives in a rich country, rank as 
high as the 84th world percentile (this is the case if he lives in Luxembourg). On the other 
hand, if he belongs to the highest national social class, his range of possible outcomes, 
although wide, is narrower than in the previous case: in the worst case scenario (if he 
lives in Tanzania), his position in the world would be in the 37th percentile while in the 
vast majority of cases he would be placed above the 90th percentile.  
 25 
 
Figure 6. Density function of one’s position in the world as function of one’s social class 
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Note: Unweighted data, each country’s ventile represents one observation.  
 
 
 A slightly different, and a  more complete, way to look at this is shown in Figure 
7. There we plot percentile ranks in the global income distribution for each social class  
against mean country income. The upward sloping curves show that, for any given social 
class, the increase in mean country income is associated with higher position of that 
social class in the global income distribution. The relationship is sharper as we move 
from low to high social classes. This means that the variability of outcomes, due to 
national idiosyncratic factors, will be greater among the nationally poor than among the 
nationally rich.  
Bottom social 
class 
Top social 
class 
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Figure 7. Social class, country mean income and position in global income distribution  
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Note: Each graph for one social class, running from 1 to 20.  
 
 In effect, the variability of positional outcomes, measured by the standard 
deviation, steadily decreases (with one exception) as social class goes up (see Figure 8). 
For low social classes (below the fifth), the standard deviation is about 30 percentiles; for 
the top social classes, the standard deviation is less than 20 percentiles. A significant 
exception to this regularity is the lowest social class whose variability of position is  less 
than that of  the second, third and the few following classes.  
 
 To summarize: if one is in the top social class of his country, the median position 
in the world that he can expect to attain  is the  92nd percentile and the standard deviation 
is only about 12 percentiles. If he belongs to the bottom social class in his country, his 
median position in the world is the 7th percentile but the standard deviation is much 
larger:  about 26 percentiles. In other words, for those who belong to low social classes 
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(“nationally poor”), location matters even more than to those who are “nationally rich”.  
To this issue we turn next.  
 
Figure 8. Standard deviation of one’s position in  world income distribution as function 
of one’s social class 
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5.  Varying importance of location for different social classes  
 
If social class is given, how well can we predict global position with knowledge of 
country income alone?  
 
When people are allocated a social class in our Rawlsian lottery, it is not a matter 
of indifference, as we have seen, what country they get allocated to. Location, if one 
“draws” a rich country,  can more than compensate for a “wrong” social class. But the 
impact of location is not uniform at all social class levels. When a person is allocated a 
country, he is also allocated two relevant features of that country: its mean income, and 
its income distribution. Table 5 shows the results  of regressions similar to (1) but with 
social class being held constant. That is, for each social class, we regress person’s 
position in world income distribution on country’s characteristics alone, its mean income 
and a measure of its inequality (the ventile’s share of total income). These two 
characteristics always explain more than 90 percent of variability in person’s position 
(with social class given). For example, looking at the people in the lowest social class, the 
R2 is about 0.9, and each 10 percent increase in mean country income is worth 2.3 
percentiles climb in the global income distribution. But for a person belonging to the top 
social class, each 10 percent increase in mean country income is worth only 1.2 
percentiles increase in the global income distribution. We find again that location matters 
more  to nationally poor than to nationally rich people.  
 
Trade-off between country’s mean income and country’s  distribution across  social 
classes 
 
The two country characteristics (mean income and its inequality, expressed as a 
ventile share) can also be seen as substitutes: given his social class, a person might prefer 
to be “allocated” into a more equal society even if its mean income is less. He could 
benefit more (if he is poor) by the first than lose by the second. Intuitively, we can also 
see that if a person is allocated to a top income class, then the gain from belonging to a 
more equal society will be negative. Thus, the trade-off between mean income and 
inequality is not the same across social classes. Going back to our example of the bottom 
social class, we see that each point increase in the bottom group’s ventile share is worth a 
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(huge) climb of 23 percentage points in world income position (see regression 1 in Table 
5). Now,  to achieve the same increase of 23 points in the global position, a person would 
need  to be located in a country twice as rich. This is the shape of the trade-off for those 
in the lowest social class.  Contrast this with the fact that  if  the ventile share of the 
people in the richest social class goes up by 1 percentage point their position in the world 
will improve by only 0.6 percentile  which is an increase equivalent to living in a country 
that is only 5 percent richer (regression 20 in Table 5).  
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However, the reasonable trade-off has to allow that the increase of 1 percentage 
point  in the ventile share is in relative terms much greater (and much less likely to 
obtain) for the poor people than for the top income class. For the poor, such an increase 
would mean a doubling of their share, for the richest, an increase of less  than 1/20 (see 
Table 6). To normalize for this and make the analysis more realistic, we consider a trade-
off  where a person is, in each case (that is, given the social class he or she belongs), 
placed in a country whose ventile share is one standard deviation above the average. This 
means that for the poorest social group, his positional gain would be 0.52 percentage 
points, for the richest group  7.35  points (see Table 6).  Now, the relative “worth” of 
national income distribution thus defined is contrasted  to the “worth” of higher mean 
country income. The results are shown in Figure 9. The importance of national 
distribution is, as expected, very high for the poor: “getting” a country whose bottom 
class’s share is one standard deviation above the mean is equivalent to “drawing“ a 
country that is 50 percent richer. The trade-off then gradually weakens before picking up 
for the richest three social groups. There too “drawing” a (very unequal) country such 
that, for example, the highest social class has a ventile share that is one standard 
deviation higher than the mean ventile share of that social class, is equivalent to living in 
a 40 percent richer  country. We therefore have to modify our earlier conclusion: for both 
the people who are “assigned” to be nationally poor and nationally rich, “drawing” 
respectively more equal or more unequal country will matter a lot. 32 
                                                 
32
 These results can be represented in the form of “iso-positional” lines with mean income on one axis, and 
social class on another axis.  
 32 
Table 6. Share of total income received by each ventile of national income 
distributions 
 
Ventile Average ventile share 
in total income (in %) 
Standard deviation of 
ventile share (in %) 
First 1.00 0.52 
Second 1.50 0.60 
Third 1.80 0.63 
Fourth 2.06 0.64 
Fifth 2.31 0.65 
Sixth 2.54 0.65 
Seventh 2.78 0.64 
Eighth 3.02 0.63 
Ninth 3.28 0.62 
Tenth 3.55 0.60 
Eleventh 3.85 0.58 
Twelfth 4.18 0.56 
13th 4.55 0.53 
14th 4.99 0.48 
15th 5.52 0.45 
16th 6.18 0.41 
17th 7.07 0.48 
18th 8.36 0.75 
19th 10.72 2.01 
Twentieth (top) 20.74 7.35 
Total 100  
Note: Calculated from 110 countries’ household survey distributions for the benchmark year 
2002. Unweighted averages. Source: WYD database.  
 
The results have implications for migration. If low social class people migrate to 
richer countries, and expect that they would end up there too among low social classes, 
then equality of the receiving country’s income distribution must be quite important for 
them. A very large increase indeed in mean country income is needed to offset this 
“distributional premium”. But differently, if nationally rich people (say, highly skilled) 
migrate from a poor to a rich country, and expect to be among high income groups in 
their new country too, then they might prefer to select highly unequal societies, even if 
their mean income is less than the mean income of an alternative migration destination. 33  
 
                                                 
33
 An interesting example is provided by Bustillo (2007, pp. 21-22). His results show that the percentage of 
immigrants monotonically decreases as one moves from poorer to richer deciles in Spain. But in the United 
States, the share of immigrants charts an inverted U curve: it is very large in the bottom and top deciles.   
 33 
Given mean  income of the recipient country, and given expectations on where 
one might be placed in the social structure of  the new country, we would expect low-
skilled people to migrate into more equal countries and more skilled people to migrate  
into more unequal countries. This parallels the idea underlying Borjas’s (1987, 1999) 
self-selection hypothesis. However, note that the picture here is a bit more complex, in 
the sense that while the increase in mean income has to be high at both ends of income 
distribution to compensate for either unequal income distribution (for the poor) or equal 
income distribution (for the rich), the offsetting increase in mean country income is rather 
minimal for middle income groups (see, for examples, ventiles 11 through 18 in Figure 
9). It means that for the middle classes, the distribution in the receiving country will not 
matter much: country’s mean income will be much more important.34 In turn, this result 
implies that for most people with moderate skill levels, or with people with high skill 
levels who do not expect to be able to make it to the top of the income ladder in the 
receiving country, it will be mean income of the receiving country that would trump other 
considerations.   
                                                 
34
 The finding parallel Palma’s (2006) recent emphasis on broad share constancy of middle deciles 
regardless of how equal or unequal the overall distribution is. In other words, inequality of distributions is 
determined by high or low shares of the top or bottom fractiles, not by the shares of the middle groups.  
 34 
 
Figure 9. Value of one standard deviation increase in the ventile share at different points 
of national income distribution (measured in terms of mean country income) 
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Note: Calculated from Tables 5 and 6.
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6. Conclusions 
 
 This paper allows us to make three key conclusions.  
 
First, with only two characteristics, person’s location (which in a world with no 
significant  migration, essentially means his place of birth), and social class (which also 
could be determined by birth), we are able to account for more than 90 percent of his/her 
position in global income distribution. The first characteristic (location) is clearly a 
“circumstance”, or a morally inconsequential, feature. It explains 60 percent of one’s 
position in global income distribution. The second characteristic, to the extent that social 
mobility is not absolute, also has a share of “circumstance” rather than “effort” in it. We 
estimate that between 1/3 and 2/3  of  the social class effect is due to circumstance. 
Recalling other obvious circumstances  (like gender) which are not included in the 
analysis, it is very unlikely than more than 1/5th of one’s position in global income 
distribution can be ascribed to one’s effort. Global equality of opportunity is rather 
minimal; perhaps, a distant dream.  
 
Second, this ability to “predict” very well one’s location in global income 
distribution from only two characteristics, holds, not only in the aggregate, but for each 
social class separately.  Thus, for any given social class, the knowledge of the country 
where a person lives is sufficient to “explain”  90 percent or more of  that person’s global 
income position. The predictive  power of country mean income is strong, not only in the 
aggregate, but for each social class. Living in a richer country is particularly important 
for low social classes, where each 10 percent increase in country’s  mean income, lifts 
person’s global income rank by 2.3 percentiles on average.  The “location premium” is 
significant but less for the top income groups where it amounts to between 1 and 1.5 
percentiles. In other words, the “average worth” of living in a richer country is shown to 
hold for the entire national income distributions, but to be particularly strong for the 
“nationally” poor.   
 
Third, given a person’ social class, there is also the trade-off between wealth of 
the country (reflected in its mean income) and its income distribution. Thus, a person 
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who is allocated a low social class might prefer to be allocated to a more egalitarian 
country even if that country’s mean income is less. The opposite, of course, holds for a 
person allocated to a high social class: he might benefit from country’s inegalitarian 
distribution more than from its high mean income. The trade-off is such that being placed 
in a country that is one standard deviation more egalitarian than the average is 
equivalent, for a person belonging to the lowest social class, to living in a 50 percent 
richer country. For a person who belongs to the highest social class, getting a one 
standard deviation more inegalitarian  country is equivalent to living in a 40 percent 
richer country. But these sharp trade-offs between internal income distribution of a 
country and its mean income hold mostly for the extreme social classes. For the middle 
classes, distribution is relatively unimportant—mostly because income shares of these 
middle groups do not vary much across nations. Thus, for the middle ventiles, “drawing” 
a one standard deviation more egalitarian country can be compensated by a small 
increase in mean country income of less than 10 percent (or even less than 5 percent in 
some cases). Consequently, for the people in the middle, wealth of the country, measured 
by its mean income, will be of paramount importance.  
 
The last point has clear implications for migration. If people who migrate expect 
to be placed in the middle of  the national income distribution of the receiving country, 
they will be focused primarily on country’s mean income.  But if people who migrate 
expect to end up in the bottom of the recipient country’s income distribution, whether the 
recipient country is egalitarian will be of significant importance in their decision-making. 
And the reverse if they expect to end up in the top of income distribution of the recipient 
country.  
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ANNEX: Some country comparisons   
 
 
Spans between the highest and lowest social classes 
 
 Table  A1 shows the countries with the greatest and smallest position spans, 
where span is defined as the difference between the position of the richest and the poorest 
social class (ventile). Colombia and  Brazil have the greatest span since the top ventile in 
both countries belongs to the 99th world percentile, and the bottom ventile belongs to the 
world’s poorest. All other countries with the highest difference between the rich and the 
poor—equal or more than 95 percentage points—are in Latin America with the exception 
of Kampuchea. All these countries have Ginis above 50.  People in these countries (with 
the exception of Kampuchea) are, on average, located between the 50th and 60th percentile 
in the world. The interpretation of this calculation (shown in column 3) is as follows: if 
we take a random person in (say) Colombia, his/her position in global income distribution 
would be at the 56th percentile.  The person with the mean income of country is often 
ranked 20 or 30 percentage points higher (see column 4). 35 
 
 At the other end, the countries with the smallest positional difference between the 
rich and the poor are all in North West Europe. Their Ginis are relatively low, ranging 
between 24 and 30. Now, the relationship between the position span and Gini is, as 
expected,  positive (the linear correlation coefficient is 0.79), but the two are not exactly 
the same thing. To see this, imagine a very rich country, say by far the richest in the 
world, which would have large income differences within it (and hence a high Gini) 
although all its citizens, including the poorest, would be positioned highly in global 
income distribution. The span would be  small even if inequality is high.  
                                                 
35
 The first measure, shown in column (3) of Table A1, represents the average  position of all people in a 
country (thus each individual is weighted equally). The second measure, shown in column (4), is the 
position in world income distribution of a person with the mean income of the country. Since income 
distributions are skewed to the right, the second value will be always higher.   
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Table A1. Position span and national Gini coefficient 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Position span National Gini Average 
position 
(rank) of 
individuals   
Position 
(rank) of the 
person with 
country’s 
mean income 
Countries with the 
largest position span 
(>=95) 
    
Colombia 98 58.7 56.2 76 
Brazil 98 59.0 58.5 77 
Kampuchea 97 73.0 29.6 60 
Paraguay 96 54.4 55.8 73 
Nicaragua  96 59.0 46.9 67 
Panama 95 56.1 51.8 71 
Countries with the 
smallest  position span 
(<25) 
    
Luxembourg 16 30.1 95.2 98 
Denmark 21 23.9 92.2 94 
Norway 21 27.4 92.8 95 
Finland  23 26.7 89.3 91 
Switzerland 24 33.0 92.8 96 
Other selected 
countries 
    
USA 38 39.9 91.0 96 
United Kingdom 57 37.4 87.2 93 
Russia 64 36.9 64.3 71 
Nigeria 65 41.8 16.6 19 
India 66 27.9 28.2 34 
Indonesia 70 34.3 33.8 41 
China 82 41.6 49.7 63 
Note: Column (3) shows the average position in the global income distribution calculated across 
all individuals of a country.  
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Great class differences in the UK 
 
Figure A1 shows the position curves for Germany, Spain and the UK. Although 
Great Britain is 30 percent richer on average than Spain (measured by household survey 
incomes), the position of its poorest ventile is significantly worse: it is at the 42nd world 
percentile as against Spain’s 59th and Germany’s (very high) 73th.  The position span in 
Great Britain is the widest of all “old OECD” countries: it is 58 percentage points vs. (for 
example) only 27 for Germany.36 The middle classes in Britain however are better off 
than the similar groups  in Spain. And at the very top, Britain’s ventiles have as high a 
position as German. Germany first-order dominates Spain.   
 
Figure A1. Position curves for three west European nations 
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 Source: WYD database for the benchmark year 2002.  
                                                 
36
 United States is more unequal than the UK but the position span (38 points) is less than in the United 
Kingdom. 
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China urban vs. India urban 
 
 As Figure A2 shows, China’s urban population is better off throughout the entire 
income distribution spectrum than the urban population in India (positional first order 
dominance holds).37 However while the difference is very large for the middle ventiles, it 
is less for the bottom and even less for the highest ventiles. The highest Chinese urban 
ventile’s has an income that places it at the 89th  percentile; for India, the equivalent 
ventile’s position is twelve percentage points lower. The overall position spans are 
similar (72 percentage points in urban India, and 70 percentage points in urban China) 
and so are the two Gini coefficients (33).  
 
Figure A2. Position curves for urban areas in China and India, year 2002 
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Source: WYD data for the benchmark year 2002. 
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 Mean Chinese urban per capita income is more than twice the Indian ($PPP 3,066 vs. $PPP 1,417).  
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Rural India vs. urban India 
 
 Figure A3 exhibits the position curves for urban and rural India. The difference 
between the two, for a given ventile, increases as we move from poor toward rich 
ventiles. The difference is small at the bottom of income distribution with the bottom 
rural ventile belonging to the 3rd lowest percentile in the world, and the poorest urban 
ventile to the 9th percentile.  
 
Figure A3. Position curves for urban and rural areas in India, year 2002 
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 Source: WYD data for the benchmark year 2002. 
 
  
 44 
Peru, Hungary, Ukraine: Similar incomes for the top, different for all others 
 
 Figure A4 shows three countries whose top ventiles have very similar incomes but 
where the rest of the population differs significantly. The distribution in Peru is much 
more unequal with all social classes but the top 20 percent having significantly lower 
$PPP incomes that the equivalently placed individuals in Hungary and Ukraine. The 
difference is the most pronounced at the bottom of the distribution. Hungary’s 
distribution dominates the other two distributions throughout most of the range except at 
the top where the differences are small, and eventually negative (compared to Peru). The 
graph illustrates also how large differences in the welfare of the population persist 
between Latin America and eastern Europe despite similarities in mean incomes of the 
countries in the two regions. In that sense, focusing on the mean income alone gives an 
incomplete, and at times misleading, picture of population’s true welfare.  
 
Figure A4.  Position curves for Hungary, Ukraine and Peru , year 2002 
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Source: WYD data for the benchmark year 2002. 
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Brazil vs. South Africa: two very unequal countries 
 
Figure 5A  highlights one important difference between Brazil and South Africa, 
whose distributions are often thought of being similar in the sense that the two countries 
are probably the most unequal (large) countries in the world. The position span,  as we 
have seen before, is huge for both and even somewhat greater for Brazil than for South 
Africa. But one important difference revealed by looking at the position curves is the 
presence of a much better-off middle class  in Brazil than in South Africa. People around 
the median of  the national income distribution in Brazil are located around the 65th  
world percentile; the similar people in South Africa are some 15 percentage points lower 
in global income distribution.  
 
 
Figure A5.  Position curves for Brazil and South Africa, year 2002 
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Russia vs. urban China  
 
 
 Russia and urban China display very similar distributions, both in terms of the 
overall positional span as well as in terms of the positions of different ventiles (see Figure 
6A).38 It is noticeable that the poor in urban China are slightly better off than the poor in 
Russia. The top 40 percent of income distribution are practically undistinguishable. 
Brazil is shown in the graph to provide a counter-point. The poor, and  large segments of 
the lower middle class are much worse off in Brazil than in the other two countries, but 
the upper middle classes and top of the Brazilian income distribution are markedly richer. 
 
 
Figure 6A. Position curves for Russia, urban China and Brazil, year 2002 
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 Source: WYD database for the benchmark year 2002. 
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38
 Obviously, the mean incomes must be very close: around $PPP 3,100 per capita for both.  
